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We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under de-
mand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the ther-
mal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. We analyze
a two-period game emphasizing the incentives for capacity investments by the ther-
mal generator. We characterize both Markov perfect and open-loop equilibria. In
the Markov perfect equilibrium, investment is discontinuous in initial capacity and
higher than it is in the open-loop equilibrium. However, since there are two distortions
in the model, equilibrium investment can be either higher or lower than the e￿cient
investment.
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It is common to ￿nd alternative electricity generation technologies coexisting in a market.
In many jurisdictions, electricity is generated from a mix of thermal (coal, oil, gas), nuclear,
and hydro generation plants. Growth of the demand for electricity has meant that increased
generation capacity is desired in many jurisdictions. Especially in deregulated markets, new
generation capacity is not easily constructed for the larger, low marginal cost, generation
technologies such as hydro and nuclear.
The main issue that we address in this paper is that of investment in new thermal
generation capacity in the presence of a large hydro competitor.1 Following deregulation
and in combination with demand growth, investment in new generation capacity occurred in
many jurisdictions and continents (most signi￿cantly in Europe and South America). Given
regulatory and environmental hurdles and substantial ￿xed costs, new hydro development
is often not an option. In this case, new capacity is commonly provided by thermal plants.
Since the incentive to invest in new capacity depends on the expected distribution of future
prices, the extent to which incumbent hydro generation a￿ects the distribution of prices
will have an e￿ect on investment in thermal capacity.
Although there has been much recent interest in models of electricity markets, there has
not been much analysis of the implications for market performance when one of the pro-
ducers has signi￿cant hydroelectric generation capability. Crampes and Moreaux [4] model
an electricity market in which a hydro producer uses a ￿xed stock of water over two periods
facing competition from a thermal producer. Bushnell [2] examines a Cournot oligopoly
with fringe producers in which each producer controls both hydro and thermal generation
facilities. Both hydro and thermal units face capacity constraints and the producers must
decide how to allocate the available water over a number of periods. Scott and Read [17]
develop a Cournot model of mixed hydro/thermal generation that is calibrated to the New
Zealand wholesale electricity market. They focus on the e￿ect of forward contracting, con-
cluding that high levels of contracting are necessary to approach an e￿cient outcome. These
papers all focus on the allocation of water by the hydro producers. In contrast, we focus
on the longer term issue of investment by the thermal producer and abstract away from
concerns about water use. 2
In restructured electricity markets, the importance of having excess market capacity
through capacity investments has been stressed (see Roques, Newbery, and Nuttall [16],
Murphy and Smeers [13], Cramton and Stoft [5], Joskow [14], among others) for the sake
of more competitive outcomes and, importantly, of system security so that possible supply
disruptions o￿set and/or unexpected peak demand met. In the past, cost-of-service regula-
tion enabled investors to recoup their investment costs through regulated rates. However,
in deregulated markets investors are motivated by pro￿ts and it is the purpose of this paper
1We describe the low cost generation technology as hydroelectric throughout this paper. The model
equally applies to any low marginal cost technology with a capacity constraint. As we are focusing on
longer-term investment dynamics, we do not model shorter-term water ￿ow dynamics explicitly.
2Papers which focus on competition between hydro generators include Ambec and Doucet [1], and
Garcia, Reitzes and Stacchetti [6].
2to examine these incentives.
There are some recent papers that have examined investment incentives in electricity
markets. Murphy and Smeers [13] examine generation capacity investments in open-loop
and closed-loop Cournot duopolies. Each duopolist makes investments in production ca-
pacities. In the open-loop game, capacities are simultaneously built and sold in long-term
contracts, in the closed-loop game, however, capacities invested in the ￿rst stage and then
they are sold in the second stage in a spot market. They ￿nd that market outcomes (in-
vestments and outputs) in the closed-loop game are in between the open-loop game and
the e￿cient outcomes. Bushnell and Ishii [3] study a simulation model of a discrete-time
dynamic Cournot game in which ￿rms make lumpy investment decisions. They calculate
the Markov perfect equilibrium investment levels in oligopoly. They ￿nd that uncertainty
in demand growth can delay investment. Garcia and Shen [7] characterize Markov perfect
equilibrium capacity expansion plans for oligopoly. They ￿nd that Cournot ￿rms underin-
vests relative to the social optimum. Garcia and Stacchetti [8] study a dynamic Bertrand
game with capacity constraints with random demand growth and periodic investments.
They ￿nd that in some equilibria total capacity falls short of demand, and hence system
security is jeopardized. They also ￿nd that price caps do not a￿ect the optimum investment
levels. These papers assume symmetric technologies with constant marginal cost of pro-
duction. In our paper, we assume asymmetric technologies with di￿erent cost structures.
This is an important feature in electricity generation industry, which is the focus of this
paper. We also compare di￿erent behavioral strategies (Markov perfect versus open-loop)
that might be used by power generators before making investment decisions.
We examine a two-period duopoly market with one ￿rm operating a hydroelectric gen-
erating plant and another operating a thermal generating plant. Both ￿rms have capacity
constraints, but only the thermal producer is able to invest in increasing its capacity. In
the ￿rst period both producers choose their outputs, and the thermal player also chooses
investment level that will be productive in the following period. In the second period both
players simultaneously choose their production levels given their capacities. Demand for
electricity in the second period is stochastic due to uncertain demand growth. We analyze
the choice of capacity by the thermal producer under demand uncertainty and characterize
both the Markov perfect and S-adapted open-loop equilibria under both binding and non-
binding hydro production constraints. We ￿nd that thermal investment is higher under
Markov perfect information and this investment may be either higher or lower than the ef-
￿cient. We also ￿nd that optimal investment is a discontinuous function of initial capacity
under the Markov perfect equilibrium, and it is a continuous function under the open-loop
structure.
2 The model
The ￿rms compete over two periods, t = 0;1. In period 0, inverse demand is known to
be P0(Q) = D   Q, with D a constant and Q the total output of the two ￿rms. Inverse
3demand in period 1 is random:
P1(Q) =
(
D +    Q with probability u
D      Q with probability d
(1)
with u+d = 1, and  >   0. This demand model allows di￿erent jump levels in demand
intercept, including increasing or ￿at demand levels in period 1. The expected demand in
period 1 is (2u   1), whenever  =  = . Hence, the demand growth will be positive as
long as u > 0:5.
There are two types of technologies in the industry: a hydroelectric generator owns
generation units that use water held behind dams to spin the electric generators and a
thermal electric generator owns thermal units that burn fossil fuel to turn the turbine.
These di￿erent generation technologies result in di￿erent cost functions for the two ￿rms.
Thermal generation is governed by the cost function C(q) = c1q + (c2=2)q2 for thermal
output (q) less than the thermal generator’s capacity, which we denote by Kt at time t.3
The thermal generator can expand capacity through investment in period 0. An investment
of I0 units of capacity costs the thermal producer (e1=2)I2
0. Investment is irreversible: I0  0
and capacity does not depreciate. The thermal producer begins the game with K0 units of
capacity, so in period one has K1 = K0 + I0 units of capacity available. Actions taken by
the thermal producer consist of investment and production in period 0 and production in
each of the period 1 demand states: (I0;q0;q1u;q1d).4
Hydroelectric power generation is generally thought of as having lower operating costs
which we model by assuming that the marginal cost of production for hydro units is zero. 5
In each period there is a maximal amount of hydro electricity that can be generated denoted
by W0. We think of this capacity as the carrying capacity of the reservoir. Essentially, we
are assuming that there is su￿cient in￿ow of water between periods 0 and 1 to restore
W0 by the beginning of period 1.6 As such, one could think of our hydro producer as
any generator with a low marginal cost but ￿xed capacity (such as one with a nuclear
generation technology). The hydro producer must choose three actions in this game: period
0 production and period 1 production in each of the two demand states. We denote a vector
of hydro producer actions as (h0;h1u;h1d).
It will be useful in the presentation of the results to let qc
u and qc
d denote the Cournot
equilibrium thermal outputs in the ￿rst period game when no constraints bind and qc
0 the











D +    2c1
3 + 2c2
: (2)
3We do not model the transmission network, and hence assume away transmission constraints, trans-
mission loss and congestion issues.
4We use the subscripts 1u to denote period one with high demand and 1d to denote period one with low
demand.
5The marginal cost of production is generally assumed to be zero, since the water turning the turbines
is commonly free.
6As the length of time between periods represents how long it takes to install additional thermal capacity,
the assumption is that the reservoir re￿lls ￿quickly￿ relative to the time to build capacity.
4The timing of the game is as follows. In period 0, players choose production quantities
simultaneously and independently to maximize their own pro￿ts. At the same time, the
thermal producer chooses how much to invest in period 1 capacity. In the second period,
players make their optimal production decisions conditional on the demand state that re-
veals under the open-loop structure, and they condition their decisions on the capacity and
demand states under the Markov-perfect structure.
We next turn to analysis of the game when the hydro constraint is non-binding. Fol-
lowing that we examine a case with a binding hydro capacity constraint.
3 Unconstrained hydro production
In this section, we will present investment strategies for the S-adapted open-loop and the
Markov perfect equilibria under the assumption that the initial water capacity, W0, is
su￿ciently large that the production constraint will not be binding for the hydro generator.
3.0.1 S-adapted open-loop equilibrium
In this subsection, we wish to compute the equilibrium outcome when the thermal producer
does not choose its investment level strategically. If there were no uncertainty, the appro-
priate equilibrium concept would be the open-loop Nash equilibrium. However, we want
the producers to be able to respond to the future demand state, in which case the appropri-
ate solution concept is the S-adapted open-loop equilibrium. Here we assume that players
have S-adapted information.7 Under S-adapted information, the producers can adjust their
period one strategies to the demand state but not to the level of thermal capacity, K1.
This means that there will be no strategic component to the thermal producer’s investment
decision.
In terms of our model, strategies can depend explicitly on the demand state, but not
on the level of thermal capacity. An S-adapted strategy for the hydro producer is H =
(h0;h1u;h1d), where h1u is period one production in the high demand state and h1d is
period one production in the low demand state. The thermal producer’s strategy is T =
(I0;q0;q1u;q1d). Each player chooses its own strategy to maximize its payo￿ function given
the rival’s strategy.





(Dt   (ht + qt))ht (3)
subject to
0  ht  W0:
7This equilibrium concept ￿rst introduced by Haurie, Zaccour and Smeers [11]. It is extended and
employed for large-scale oligopolies by Haurie and Moresino [12], Genc, Reynolds and Sen [9], and Genc
and Sen [10]. In this equilibrium, players condition their decisions on time period, demand state and initial
capacity. This equilibrium concept is between closed loop and open loop equilibrium concepts (see, e.g.,
Genc, Reynolds and Sen [9] and Pineau and Murto [15]).
5E0 denotes the expectation taken with respect to information available at time 0. As
mentioned above, we assume that W0 is su￿ciently large that the capacity constraint will
not be binding.


















0  qt  Kt;
K1 = K0 + I0:
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium strategies for this game:
Proposition 1:For W0 su￿ciently large, that is W0 > (D +    K0   IO
0b)=2,
where IO
0b is de￿ned below, that the hydro producer is not constrained, the S-
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Proof: Since there is enough water available that the hydro constraints do not
bind, the hydro producer plays its ￿static￿ best response in each period. Speci￿-
cally h0 =
D q0
2 , h1u =
D+ q1u
2 , and h1d =
D  q1d
2 .
The period 0 thermal production choice has no bearing on the payo￿s of any of
other thermal actions, so which case obtained below is of no consequence to the
equilibrium investment and period 1 outputs. The Lagrangian function for the



















[at(Kt   qt)] (7)
where at  0 are the Lagrange multipliers on the capacity constraints 8. The










8The non-negativity constraints do not bind for the situations we are interested in, so we suppress their
multipliers to simplify the presentation.
6for t = 0;1u;1d.
When the initial capacity is high enough, that is it is greater than the Cournot
output in the high demand state, qc
u < K0, investment is clearly zero. Investment
will not be used and it is costly, hence it must be zero in equilibrium.
Given the assumption K0 < K0 < qc
u, it is clear that a1u > a1d = 0. It
follows that q1u = K0 + I0, and q1d =
D  h1d c1
2+c2 . The output levels at t = 0
is irrelevant of investment decision because of the lag between investment and
production, hence either q0 = D h0 c1
2+c2 , or q0 = K0 holds.
Next we solve the best response functions for the equilibrium points. By substi-
tuting one player’s response functions into other’s functions we obtain that q1d =
(D ) 2c1
3+2c2 and h1d =
(D )(1+c2)+c1
3+2c2 . Since q1u = K0 + I0, h1u = D+ K0 I0
2 .
At time 0, either q0 = D 2c1
3+2c2 or q0 = K0 and the hydro producer plays its best
response.
For optimal investment outcomes we note that the period one capacity con-
straints only bind when demand is high, so investment only has an impact in
that state. We then obtain a1u = u[D +    2q1u   h1u   c2q1u   c1]. Using
the equilibrium q1u and h1u from above and noting that the optimal investment
choice satis￿es I0 = a1u
e1 , we get the equilibrium I0 of the proposition.
Next, given the assumption 0 < K0 < K0, it is clear that a1u > 0; a1d > 0.
It follows that q1u = K0 + I0 = q1d. Next we solve the best response functions
for the equilibrium points. By substituting one player’s response functions into
other’s functions we obtain that h1d =
D  K0 I0
2 , since q1d = K0 + I0. Also,
since q1u = K0+I0, h1u = D+ K0 I0
2 . At time 0, either q0 = D 2c1
3+2c2 or q0 = K0
and the hydro producer plays its best response.
For optimal investment outcomes we note that the period one capacity con-
straints bind in both demand states. We then obtain a1u = u[D+ 2q1u h1u 
c2q1u  c1], a1d = (1 u)[D   2q1d  h1d  c2q1d  c1]. Using the equilibrium
q1u, q1d, h1uand h1d from above and noting that the optimal investment choice
satis￿es I0 =
a1u+a1d
e1 , we get the equilibrium I0 of the proposition.
We obtain the lower bound of initial capacity, K0, that entails non-binding ca-
pacity at the down state demand by solving K0 + I0 > qc
d. Similarly, we obtain
the upper bound of the initial capacity that entails binding capacity at the down
state demand by solving K0 + I0 < qc
d, where the di￿erent investment expres-
sions are as de￿ned in the proposition. Because of the continuity of investments
the upper bound and the lower bound on the initial capacities are identical. In
this proposition we assume that the water level is plentiful enough so that water
constraints do not bind at all. We need to ￿nd the lower bound of the water level
in which water constraints do not bind at any period. Hydro best response in
the upstate demand is h1u = (D +    q1u)=2. The maximum value of this best
response, denoted by h1u, is obtained when q1u gets its minimum value. This
7happens when q1u = K0 + I0, in which I0 = IO
0b satisfying (5) for the inter-
val 0 < K0 < K0. Therefore, whenever W0 > h1u is satis￿ed the equilibrium
proposed in proposition 1 characterizes investment levels for the case in which
water level is high and water constraints are interior for all demand levels. 
When there is substantial initial thermal capacity, the initial capacity is enough to
cover the maximum Cournot output, K0 > qc
u, the equilibrium investment must be zero.
Any incremental investment would generate excess non-utilized capacity at a positive cost.
Hence, the optimum investment strategy by the thermal player is ￿do not invest￿. For low
initial capacity, 0 < K0 < K0, the period 1 capacity binds in both demand states. In this
case, the level of investment is determined by the sum of the capacity prices (i.e., shadow
prices for the binding capacity constraints). For intermediate values of initial thermal
capacity, K0 < K0 < qc
u, the period 1 capacity constraint is binding if demand is high and
non-binding if demand is low. In this case, only the shadow price of capacity in the high
demand in￿uences investment. Capacity will be fully utilized in the high demand state and
there will be excess capacity in the low demand state.
The comparative statics on investment following from Proposition 1 are natural. Equi-
librium investment is increasing in the probability of high demand (u) and the level of
demand (D) and decreasing in initial capacity (K0), the cost of investment (e1), and the
cost of thermal production (c1 and c2).
In order to discuss the implications of strategic behavior on investment we next analyze
equilibrium investment under Markov perfect information.
3.0.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In the S-adapted open-loop equilibrium, the thermal producer does not take into account
the in￿uence that its investment choice has on the hydro producer’s output choice in period
one. This is a consequence of the S-adapted information structure. Players using open-loop
strategies commit to their strategies at the beginning of the game, that is each player’s
choice of actions is predetermined. However Markovian strategies are state dependent and
under which players do not commit to their action plans at the outset. Denote the Markov
perfect strategies of the two producers by H(Dt;Wt) and T(Dt;Wt). We assume that
both producers observe Wt and Dt before making decisions in period t. The Markov perfect
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in Markov perfect strategies.
Proposition 2: For W0 su￿ciently large,that is W0 > (D +    K0   IM
0b )=2,
where IM
0b is de￿ned below, that the hydro producer is not constrained, the Markov
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Proof: The only di￿erence in the proof of this proposition and that of Proposi-
tion 1 is in the determination of investment. The best responses by both players
in period one are the same as they are in the S-adapted open-loop game. Hence,
conditional on K1, outputs in period one are the same. However, investment in
capacity by the thermal producer, and hence K1, may di￿er.
Under the assumption K0
0 < K0 < qc
u , investment only provides bene￿ts in
stage 1u. Let T
1u(K1) be the pro￿t to the thermal investor in period 1u when it











D +    h1u(K1)   2K1   K1h0
1u(K1)   c1   c2K1

= 0: (12)
When q1u = K1, we know that h1u(K1) = D+ K1
2 is the hydro producers best
response. Substituting this for h1u(K1) and K1 = K0 + I0 and simplifying we
have
I0a =
u[D +    K0(2 + 2c2)   2c1]
2(e1 + u(1 + c2))
(13)
We obtain the lower bound of initial capacity, K0
0, that entails non-binding ca-
pacity at the down state demand by solving K0 + I0a > qc
d.
Under the assumption 0 < K0 < K00
0 , investment provides bene￿ts in both stages
1u and 1d. The optimal investment must satisfy
 e1I0 + u

D +    h1u(K1)   2K1   K1h0





D      h1d(K1)   2K1   K1h0
1d(K1)   c1   c2K1

= 0:
When q1u = K1, h1u(K1) = D+ K1
2 is the hydro producer’s best response, and
when q1d = K1, h1d(K1) =
D  K1
2 . Substituting these terms into the above
optimality condition and simplifying we obtain
I0b =
[D      K0(2 + 2c2)   2c1] + u[ + ]
2(e1 + 1 + c2)
(15)
Also, we obtain the upper bound of initial capacity, K00
0, that entails binding
capacity at the down state demand by solving K0 + I0b < qc
d.
9The remaining capacity interval is K00
0 < K0 < K0
0. When the initial capacity
falls into this region in which K0
0 < qc
d, the optimal investment will satisfy
Io = qc
d  K0 so that period 1 capacity just becomes equal to the Cournot output
in the downstate demand. In this proposition we assume that the water level is
￿high￿ so that water constraints do not bind at all. The water level that satis￿es
this property is calculated as follows. The hydro best response in the upstate
demand is h1u = (D +    q1u)=2. The maximum value of this best response,
denote h1u, is obtained when q1u gets its minimum value. This happens when
q1u = K0 + IM
0b . Therefore, whenever W0 > h1u is satis￿ed the equilibrium
proposed in proposition 2 characterizes investment levels for the case in which
water level is high and water constraints are interior for all demand stages. 
The investment rule de￿ned in Proposition 2 clearly satis￿es IM




0a is obtained when the thermal production constraint binds in the high
demand state only. Whereas, IM
0b is obtained when the thermal production constraints bind
in both high and low demand states. Both IM
0a and IM
0b are decreasing in the investment cost
parameter e1. However, the investment level is una￿ected by the investment cost parameter
in some cases (when it is equal to  K0+qc
d). The reason for this is that the marginal pro￿t
of investment is discontinuous at the investment level of  K0+qc
d. At this level, K1 is equal
to the Cournot output at low demand, qc
d. At an investment level lower than  K0 +qc
d the
capacity constraint for the thermal producer will bind if demand is low. In this case, the
marginal pro￿t of investment includes the bene￿t of additional capacity in both high and
low demand states. However, for investment larger than  K0 + qc
d the marginal pro￿t of
investment includes the bene￿t of additional capacity in the high demand state alone, as the
bene￿t is nil in the low demand state. Consequently the marginal pro￿t of investment has
a downward-jumping discontinuity at I0 =  K0 + qc




pro￿t is positive to the left of this discontinuity and negative to the right. This results in
the thermal producer choosing to invest the precise quantity that yields K1 = qc
d.













For K0 > qc
u investment will yield no bene￿t since the capacity constraint will not bind in
the high demand state, whereas, for K0 < qc
u investment yields a strictly positive bene￿t
in period 1 since the capacity constraint binds with a positive probability.
The two discontinuities in the the marginal pro￿t of investment for the thermal producer
are a result of the thermal producer taking into account how its capacity in period 1 a￿ects
the hydro producer’s output. The hydro producer’s output as a function of K1 is not
smooth across the two thresholds generating the discontinuities. Hence the investment rule
in the S-adapted equilibrium of Proposition 1 does not exhibit the same behavior as that
10in the Markov perfect equilibrium.
The strategic behavior of the thermal producer also has implications for the level of
investment. We know from the proof of Proposition 2, @h1u=@IM
0 =  1=2 in the Markov
perfect game, which should lead to higher equilibrium investment, i.e., the strategic ef-
fect associated with investment in thermal capacity results in ￿aggressive￿ behavior by the
thermal producer. We summarize this result in:
Corollary: The Markov perfect equilibrium investment is larger than the S-
adapted open-loop equilibrium investment.
Proof: We will give the sketch of the proof, since we described the rationale
above. When we closely look at the investment expressions under Markov perfect
and open-loop equilibria we notice four regions of initial capacity under which
we should compare investment expressions. The ￿rst region is RO
1 and found
as follows. Let RO
1 = fK0jK0 < K0 < qc
ug, and RM
1 = fK0jK0





1 since K0 > K0
0. Under the region RO
1 , clearly IO
0a < IM
0a.
Let the second region be RM
2 , which is computed as follows. RO
2 = fK0j0 <
K0 < K0g, and RM






0. Under the region RM
2 , clearly IO
0b < IM
0b .
The third region is denoted by RM





0 < K0 < K0
0g and the bounds on the initial capacities




0c =  K0 + qc
d for open-loop and Markov perfect structures,
respectively. After substituting IM
0c into IO




0c (3 + 2c2)
2e1 + 3 + 2c2
+
u( + )
2e1 + 3 + 2c2
Note that to have the region RM
3 exist we need to have K00








and also e1 > 1=2. Given these conditions and the above
equality we obtain that IO
0b < IM
0c .
The fourth region for the initial capacity is as a result of intersection of RO
2 and
RM
1 . Denote this intersection RM
4 , and RM
4 = fK0jK0
0 < K0 < K0g. In this
region we need to compare IM
0a and IO
0b. Given that to have this region exist we
need to satisfy K0
0 > 0 and K0 < qc
d, we ￿nd that IM
0a > IO
0b. 
To illustrate investment patterns under both equilibrium concepts we solve the model for
an example. We employ the following parameters and compute the optimal investments as
a function of initial capacity K0, as the initial capacity varies in the regions speci￿ed in the
propositions 1 and 2. We use D = 100, u = 0:5,  = 10,  = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 1, e1 = 1.
In Figure 1 the vertical axis denotes investment and the horizontal axis denotes initial
capacity. The equilibrium investment under open-loop structure is represented by a solid
line in which there are three regimes as a result of three regions for initial capacities. As


























Figure 1: Thermal investment: S-adapted Open Loop (solid line) and Markov Perfect
(dashed line)
computed in proposition 1 in equation (5), the slope for equilibrium investment starts from
 (3+2c2)=(2e1+3+2c2) =  5=7 then drops (in absolute value) to  u(3+2c2)=(2e1+u(3+
2c2)) =  5=9 and ￿nally reaches to zero in which investment quantity is zero since initial
capacity is abundant. The dashed line represents Markov perfect equilibrium investment
as a function of the initial capacity. There are four di￿erent slopes for the investment
function under Markov perfect equilibrium and the investment function is discontinuous.
It starts from  (2 + 2c2)=(2e1 + 2 + 2c2) =  2=3 and increases (in absolute value) to
-1 and then drops to  u(2 + 2c2)=(2e1 + u(2 + 2c2)) =  1=2 and ￿nally jumps to zero.
The jump in investment function happens when there is enough capacity to cover the
Cournot output in the highest demand scenario. The marginal pro￿t of thermal player
in investment drops below zero since the cost of each incremental investment exceeds the
bene￿t of that investment. Indeed there is no bene￿t of each incremental investment when
hydro player production is unconstrained and thermal initial capacity is greater than the
maximum Cournot output. Also, as can be seen in the ￿gure investment under Markov
perfect information structure exceeds that of under open-loop structure.
In Figure 2, we plot K1 versus K0 given the equilibrium investments in Figure 1. This
￿gure has the same characteristics as that in Figure 1. Period 1 capacities become identical
when there is no investment under both equilibria, otherwise Markov perfect equilibrium
market capacity exceeds that of under the open-loop one.




























Figure 2: Thermal capacity: S-adapted Open Loop (solid line) and Markov Perfect (dashed
line)
4 Constrained hydro production
In the previous section, we examined optimum thermal investment behavior when the hydro
player had plenty of water in which its production constraint did not bind at all. Now we
relax this assumption and allow binding water constraints in both periods of the game.
There are two possibilities here: W0 can be very low such that the hydro constraint binds
in both periods, or of an intermediate level where it binds in the high demand state only.
We focus on the former case here.9 This case represents a market structure in which the
thermal player faces a small hydro player that does not have enough reservoir capacity to
satisfy its Cournot output in the low demand scenario. The thermal ￿rm will act like a
monopolist facing hydro player whose supply is perfectly inelastic.
When the water level is low (i.e., 0 < W0 < hc
1d) the water constraint binds in both
high and low demand cases and the thermal player acts as a monopolist facing the residual
demand given by q1u = D +  W0  P1u and q1d = D    W0  P1d, where P1u and P1d
are market prices at up and down states in period 1.10 In this case the S-adapted open-loop
9We have analyzed the latter case in which water constraint only binds in the high demand state, however
the investment behavior is qualitatively similar to that in Section 3.1, hence we do not report the results
here.
10Indeed, the tightest upper bound for the initial water level under which hydro constraint is always
binding satis￿es W0 < h1d = (D    qd)=2, where qd = K0 +I0 and I0 is de￿ned above in expression (16)
for the initial capacity interval 0 < K0 < K0.
13Nash equilibrium investment strategies will satisfy:
I0 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if qu < K0
u[D+ c1 K0(2+c2) W0]
e1+u(2+c2) if K0 < K0 < qu
[D  c1 K0(2+c2) W0]+u[+]
e1+2+c2 if 0 < K0 < K0
(16)
For the sake of briefness we do not write all the steps that give directions to the solution,
but we describe how we obtain the above equilibrium investment levels. In the case of
constrained hydro production, there are three parameter regions in which i) either initial
thermal capacity is high so that thermal production is unconstrained in the upstate and
hence the investment quantity is zero, ii) or initial capacity is in medium level so that
thermal player is constrained in the up demand state but unconstrained in the down demand
state, and hence investment is positive to cover the demand in upstate, iii) or the initial
thermal capacity is low so that the thermal player is constrained in both up and down
demand states, in which the investment is positive and is being a￿ected by both demand
states.
When K0 < K0 < qu the best response functions will satisfy q1u = K0 + I0, h1u = W0,
q1d < q1u, and h1d = W0 in period 1 up and down states for both players. The optimum
investment satis￿es I0 = a1u=e1, in which a1u = u[D +  2q1u  h1u  c2q1u  c1]. Solving
it for investment yields the above equilibrium level. When 0 < K0 < K0, the equilibrium
output levels are q1u = K0 + I0 = q1d, h1u = W0 = h1d, the equilibrium investment
satis￿es I0 = (a1u + a1d)=e1, in which a1u = u[D +    2q1u   h1u   c2q1u   c1] and
a1d = (1   u)[D      2q1d   h1d   c2q1d   c1]. Solving it for the investment gives the
above result. Clearly, when the initial capacity is high, that is qu < K0, the thermal player
does not invest. Note that the lower bound of initial capacity under which the thermal
player does not invest satis￿es qu = (D +  c1  W0)=(2+c2), which is the best response
function of thermal player in the upstate demand when the rival hydro player dumps all of
its available capacity into the market.
Next we characterize investment under the Markov perfect equilibrium when the water
level is low. In this case the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium investment strategies are
similar to the one described in Proposition 2 and will satisfy:
I0 =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if qu < K0
u[D+ c1 K0(2+c2) W0]
e1+u(2+c2) if K0
0 < K0 < qu
 K0 + qc
d if K00
0 < K0 < K0
0
[D  c1 K0(2+c2) W0]+u[+]
e1+2+c2 if 0 < K0 < K00
0
(17)
We calculate the equilibrium investments under the Markov perfect structure as follows.
1. In period 1 at the upstate demand the thermal best response function is q1u = (D +
   c1   h1u)=(2 + c2). Since the water level is low the hydro player will produce at
the available water level, which is W0, then the best response quantity for thermal
player becomes q1u = (D +    c1   W0)=(2 + c2). Denote this quantity qu. Clearly
14when qu < K0 is satis￿ed upstate capacity constraint is non-binding and hence the
investment quantity is zero.
2. When only upstate thermal constraint is binding the optimum investment satis￿es
 e1I0 + u

D +    h1u(K1)   2K1   K1h0
1u(K1)   c1   c2K1

= 0. The equilibrium
outputs in the upstate become h1u = W0 and q1u = K0 +I0, and h0
1u(K1) = 0. Plug-
ging these quantities into the above equality and simplifying, we obtain the optimal
investment described above for K0 < K0 < qu. The value of lower bound K0 can be
obtained similar to the one obtained in proposition 2: it will satisfy the property that
downstate production is interior.
3. When the initial thermal capacity is ￿low￿, that is 0 < K0 < K00
0, both upstate and




D +    h1u(K1)   2K1   K1h0




D      h1d(K1)   2K1   K1h0
1d(K1)   c1   c2K1

= 0 ;
in which the optimum outputs are h1u = W0, q1u = K0 + I0 = q1d, and h1d = W0,
and also h0
1u(K1) = 0 and h0
1d(K1) = 0. Plugging these expressions into the above
expression we obtain the investment level for 0 < K0 < K00
0. The bound K00
0 can be
obtained similar to the one obtained in proposition 2: it will be equal to down state
interior Cournot thermal output minus the above investment level for the interval
0 < K0 < K00
0.
4. When the initial capacity satis￿es K00
0 < K0 < K0
0 < qc
d, the optimal investment will
satisfy Io = qc
d   K0.
The comparison of the investment expressions (16) and (17) yields the following results.
Whenever the water level is low so that hydro production is constrained all times, there
are thermal capacity regions in which Markov perfect and S-adapted open-loop equilibria
investment levels coincide. However, there are also regions where they do not coincide.
Similar to the case with unconstrained hydro production, thermal investment is discontin-
uous in the Markov perfect equilibrium while it is continuous in the open-loop equilibrium.
Finally, in the Markov perfect equilibrium there is a capacity region in which the thermal
investment is independent of the hydro producer’s capacity and output. Outside of this
region there is a negative relationship between thermal investment and the hydro capacity.
4.1 Discussion
The results of the previous two sections imply that total output is higher in the Markov
perfect equilibrium than in the open-loop equilibrium (when they di￿er). Consequently,
prices are lower when strategic e￿ects are allowed for. It is important to note that even
15though prices are lower, this does not mean that the Markov perfect equilibrium is neces-
sarily more e￿cient. The increased output comes about through ine￿cient investment in
the cases where the hydro producer has excess capacity. When the hydro producer is not
operating at capacity clearly it would be e￿cient to increase output by increasing hydro
production. In the Markov perfect equilibrium however, the increased output comes about
through increased thermal production that is made possible through a costly investment.
Whether or not the thermal producer chooses a capacity that is greater or less than
the e￿cient level of investment depends on two con￿icting forces. First, since the hydro
producer is restricting output, increasing thermal capacity can be e￿cient in that it reduces
the loss due to the exercise of market power. Second, since the hydro producer has lower
production costs, if it is not constrained it is e￿cient for any increased output to come from
the hydro producer, not by the thermal producer increasing capacity. Either of these forces
might dominate, hence we conclude that equilibrium capacity investment by the thermal
producer may be either higher or lower than the e￿cient. To prove it we simply look at two
limiting cases W0 ! 0 and W0 ! 1. As W0 ! 0, we are in the setting of Section 4. Hydro
production goes to zero and the thermal producer has a monopoly. Thermal monopoly
output and investment is clearly lower than what would be e￿cient. At the other extreme,
as W0 ! 1, equilibrium investment under duopoly is as we have described in Propositions 1
and 2 of Section 3, i.e., positive. In this case, the e￿cient level of investment is clearly zero
since hydro production can meet all contingencies and we have over-investment relative to
the e￿cient level.
5 Conclusions
Capacity investments in electricity markets is one of the main issues in the restructuring
process to ensure competition and enhance system security of networks. In the presence
of evolving demand, possible supply disruptions, and government incentives, production
capacity investments have occurred in many jurisdictions. In this case a simple but an
interesting question arises: What is the investment behavior when two di￿erent technologies
compete in an electricity market? In this regard we have analyzed a duopolistic electricity
market in which hydro and thermal generators compete when two di￿erent information
structures may be observed.
We have studied dynamic competition between thermal and hydroelectric producers un-
der demand uncertainty, showing that strategic e￿ects result in higher investment in thermal
generating capacity than when open-loop strategies are used. In addition, investment is
a discontinuous function of initial capacity in the Markov perfect equilibrium. However,
this higher investment may be ine￿cient. Essentially there are two sources of ine￿ciency:
the distortion caused by market power and the distortion caused by the industry using an
ine￿cient mix of generating technologies.
In our analysis, in the case of large and unconstrained hydro the thermal investment may
be considered as optimum capacity chosen by entry of potential thermal producer. Indeed,
in hydroelectricity dominated jurisdictions (like Quebec, Norway, Brazil, New Zealand)
16possible entry is expected by less capital intensive thermal generators. In this case, our
paper presents optimal thermal investment under di￿erent behavioral assumptions. In the
case of constrained hydro, the capacity expansion could be expected from thermal and
nuclear generators. For instance, in Ontario, Canada hydro facilities are limited due to
environmental and geographic constraints, and capacity investments are done by thermal
generators.
In this paper we assumed a duopolistic market structure. Even though the quadratic
thermal cost structure allows aggregate costs by di￿erent thermal generators, for the sake
of simplicity we assumed the same ownership of these thermal generators. Also, we only al-
lowed investment by thermal player. However, in some jurisdictions market capacity could
be expanded by constructing new dams. Also, in some jurisdictions investment in other
technologies, like green technologies, have occurred. For example, capacity investments in
wind farms in Germany and Denmark are becoming an important source of power genera-
tion. An interesting extension of our model would be to incorporate investment in all types
of power generation technologies, which we leave for future research.
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